

No. 95 - 559

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1995

**DOCTOR'S ASSOCIATES, INC.
and NICK LOMBARDI,**

Petitioners,

v.

PAUL CASAROTTO and PAMELA CASAROTTO,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to
the Supreme Court of Montana

**BRIEF FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
FRANCHISE ASSOCIATION AND THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, AS AMICI CURIAE
SUPPORTING PETITIONERS**

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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE

The International Franchise Association ("IFA"), founded in 1960, is the oldest and largest trade association in the world representing the interests of franchising. IFA has more than 750 franchisor members and, since first inviting franchisees to join in 1993, has already attracted more than 27,000 franchisee members. IFA serves as a resource center for current and prospective franchisors and fran-

chisees, state and federal government agencies, and the public. IFA also represents the interests of franchising before legislatures, the courts, and the public. The Association has been instrumental in promoting balanced legislation to regulate franchising practices in the United States.

A franchise is a contractual relationship in which the franchisor, the owner of a business concept and associated trademarks or service marks, authorizes a franchisee to conduct a business that is identified by the franchisor's marks and uses the franchisor's format and operating system. The contractual relationship is defined by a franchise or license agreement, which sets forth the respective obligations of the franchisor and franchisee. To promote uniformity in their franchise networks, franchisors utilize standardized agreements. However, such "form" agreements are frequently subject to negotiation. An increasing number of franchising companies, in an effort to resolve disputes with their franchisees in the least costly, least disruptive and most expeditious manner possible, include in their franchise agreements an undertaking to resolve disputes by arbitration, binding on both the franchisor and the franchisee. Such agreements obligate the parties to arbitrate disputes, usually under the auspices of the American Arbitration Association or similar organization, and often in the home state of the franchisor. In the past year alone, almost 400 arbitrations involving franchise relationships were initiated with the American Arbitration Association.

The Securities Industry Association ("SIA") is a not-for-profit corporation formed under the laws of Delaware. SIA is the securities industry trade association representing the interests of more than 700 securities firms in

North America, which collectively account for 90% of securities firms' revenue in the United States.

The relationship between SIA members and their customers, particularly those who borrow money from member, or who trade in options, is sometimes governed by a written agreement which contains a clause requiring the arbitration of disputes. Most of these agreements also contain a choice-of-law provision. SIA has a deep concern that these agreements be enforced in accordance with the terms of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"). SIA has been a successful plaintiff against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the State of Florida in cases to enforce arbitration clauses despite restrictive state laws or regulations. Consistent enforcement of arbitration agreements is important to both SIA members and their customers since inconsistent enforcement of the FAA will lead to uncertainty and confusion for both parties to the contract.

Historically, many state courts and state legislatures have looked with disfavor on arbitration, especially when it occurred as the result of a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate. Whether this reluctance to honor agreements to arbitrate stemmed from the belief that arbitration did not afford the same procedural or substantive safeguards as litigation, or whether it grew out of the states' desire to preserve in-state forums for their citizens, the end result was that arbitration agreements were routinely disregarded. With the passage of the FAA and rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements under the FAA, especially by federal courts, most state courts and legislatures grudgingly accepted arbitration as a legitimate means of resolving disputes. In the past several years, however, a backlash has occurred. A number of states, including Montana and most recently California, have enacted statutes that, under the guise of ensuring that arbitration

agreements are freely entered into, seriously undermine the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate, and courts have upheld the validity of these statutes despite the preemptive reach of the FAA. One of the most prevalent examples of such legislation is the Montana statute that is the subject of the Montana Supreme Court's two decisions below.¹ That statute requires that notice of the existence of an agreement to resolve disputes by arbitration be displayed on the first page of the contract in underlined, capital letters, a requirement that is applicable only to arbitration agreements, not to contracts generally. While federal courts have consistently struck down anti-arbitration statutes of this type on preemption grounds, a growing number of state courts, of which the Montana Supreme Court is but the latest example, have held otherwise, permitting states to single out arbitration agreements for unfavorable treatment.

Amici are vitally concerned about this case because permitting the most recent decision of the Montana Supreme Court to stand, particularly after this Court's summary vacatur and remand of the case for consideration in light of *Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson*, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995), will encourage other state courts and legislatures to undertake similar steps to undercut the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate and further thwart

¹ The Montana Supreme Court's most recent opinion in this case, dated August 31, 1995, together with the special concurrence and dissent, is printed as Appendix A to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari filed with the Court in this case. The Montana Supreme Court's initial opinion in this case, dated December 15, 1994, together with the special concurrence and dissents, is printed as Appendix B to the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. References to the lower court's opinions are designated "App. A" and "App. B," respectively, followed by a page reference.

the strong federal policy favoring arbitration. Legislatures will continue to enact statutes that impose burdensome conditions on the formation or performance of arbitration agreements. And courts will continue to invoke these statutes to overturn arbitration agreements either by disregarding parties' choice-of-law clauses or, what is worse, by applying these clauses ostensibly to honor the parties' "intention" to forgo arbitration in the face of an unambiguous agreement to arbitrate. As a result, franchisors and securities firms that include arbitration provisions in their form agreements will either be forced to tailor their agreements to the laws of 50 different states or forgo the many advantages inherent in the arbitration process. Even now, the inconsistent treatment of arbitration agreements caused by state notice provisions introduces great uncertainty into the enforcement of those agreements and spawns satellite litigation over the enforceability of the notice provisions that threatens to erase the benefits of economy and efficiency that arbitration was originally intended to produce.

Pursuant to Rule 37.3 of the Rules of this Court, IFA and SIA, respectfully submit this brief as *amici curiae* in support of petitioners. Because many IFA members, both franchisors and franchisees, and many securities firms, utilize arbitration as a means of resolving disputes, IFA and SIA have a substantial interest in the outcome of this case and are able to provide an additional and broader prospective on the issues presented. IFA and SIA believe this brief will assist the Court in analyzing and resolving these issues. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief, and their written consents have been filed with the Clerk of Court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In the decision below, the Montana Supreme Court persists in underestimating the preemptive reach of Section 2 of the FAA by holding that Montana's notice requirement for arbitration agreements does not violate the Supremacy Clause. In doing so, the Montana Supreme Court continues to disregard two controlling decisions of this Court, *Southland Corp. v. Keating*, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and *Perry v. Thomas*, 482 U.S. 483 (1987), both of which held that states may not restrict the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate except on "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. Since Montana's notice requirement is directed exclusively at arbitration provisions and not at any other contractual terms, it is preempted by the FAA. In addition to conflicting with *Southland* and *Perry*, the Montana Supreme Court's decision also runs directly contrary to the decisions of the three federal courts of appeals that have addressed the issue, all of which held that state arbitration notice requirements are preempted by the FAA. Instead of following these decisions, the court below in its initial opinion relied on two intermediate state courts in Indiana and Texas that upheld similar notice provisions. Reversal of the decision below is necessary to signal to state courts and legislatures that, for purposes of preemption under the FAA, burdening the enforceability of arbitration agreements with a notice provision is no different than declaring those agreements unenforceable *per se*.

By maintaining that Montana's notice provision does not undermine the goals and policies of the FAA because it ensures consensual arbitration, the Montana Supreme Court also continues to distort this Court's holding in *Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University*, 489 U.S. 468 (1989). The deci-

sion in *Volt* was premised on the notion that the primary purpose of the FAA is to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, even where those agreements allow for arbitration to be stayed pending the resolution of related litigation. Because the parties here chose the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules and Connecticut law, not Montana law, to govern their arbitration agreement, *Volt* requires that their choice be upheld and not, as the Montana Supreme Court reasoned, that another state's law be substituted that would invalidate the parties' agreement to arbitrate. In addition, although in *Volt* this Court observed that the FAA does not entirely preempt state arbitration laws, and in particular state laws governing the procedures under which arbitration is conducted, the Montana Supreme Court perverted this holding into a license to enforce a state arbitration law that went to the very substance of the right to arbitrate, prohibiting arbitration from occurring altogether. The Montana Supreme Court's conclusion that the FAA mandates the enforcement only of those arbitration agreements that are entered into "knowingly," which Montana's notice provision is purportedly designed to promote, flies in the face of the FAA's insistence that arbitration agreements be placed on the same footing as other agreements. Because of the purported solicitude for arbitration of the majority of the Montana Supreme Court, when in fact its decision and the statute it enforced are based on hostility to arbitration agreements, it is crucial that this Court reverse the Montana Supreme Court's most recent decision in this case to discourage similar attempts by state courts and legislatures to undermine the FAA on the pretext of furthering its goals and policies.

The Montana Supreme Court's decisions below are also premised on judicial and legislative hostility to arbitra-

tion, which has long been discredited by this Court in view of the many advantages that arbitration affords over traditional litigation. These advantages include speed, economy, adjudicative expertise and the capacity to preserve long-term relationships once the dispute is resolved. To enforce statutes like Montana's either would deprive the parties to a franchise relationship of these advantages altogether, or would seriously impede the use of arbitration in the franchise relationship by forcing franchisors to tailor their contract documents to meet the arbitration requirements of 50 different states. Moreover, the Montana Supreme Court's reasoning is based on unsupported and unfounded assumptions regarding the negotiability of arbitration agreements and the role of forum-selection clauses in those agreements.

ARGUMENT

I.

MONTANA'S STATUTORY NOTICE PROVISION FOR ARBITRATION IS PREEMPTED BY THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT

In maintaining that the FAA does not preempt Montana's statute requiring that a contract containing an arbitration agreement include a conspicuous notice to that effect on the face of the contract, the Montana Supreme Court continues to disregard two of this Court's controlling precedents and a substantial number of lower federal court decisions that flatly refute the Montana Supreme Court's holding. In so doing, the Montana Supreme Court has severely restricted the preemptive reach of the FAA. Moreover, to justify its hostility to arbitration, the Montana Supreme Court persists in distorting this Court's holding in *Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees*

of *Leland Stanford Junior University*, 489 U.S. 468 (1989), into a license to disregard arbitration agreements on the pretext of honoring the parties' intentions.

A. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Disregards Prior Decisions Of This Court And Other Lower Federal Courts

In the decision below, the Montana Supreme Court "re-affirm[ed] and reinstate[d]" its prior holding that the Montana notice provision is not preempted by Section 2 of the FAA because the notice requirement does not undermine the goals and policies of the FAA. App. A at 7a. In so doing, however, the Montana Supreme Court continues to disregard this Court's controlling decisions in *Southland Corp. v. Keating*, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and *Perry v. Thomas*, 482 U.S. 483 (1987). In holding that a provision of the California Franchise Investment Law requiring judicial consideration of claims brought under the statute was preempted by the FAA, this Court in *Southland* declared that state law may limit the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate *only* upon "'grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of *any* contract.'" 465 U.S. at 11 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2) (emphasis added). Likewise, in *Perry*, this Court struck down a provision of the California Labor Code, which precluded arbitration of wage collection claims, on the ground that the California law did not "[arise] to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally," but rather "[took] its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue." 482 U.S. at 492 n. 9.

The Montana statute at issue here is preempted by the FAA because it clearly "takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue." Montana does not require that any other contractual provision be

flagged with a conspicuous notice provision on the first page of the contract. Arbitration agreements alone are burdened with this requirement in Montana—burdened, in that the absence of such a notice renders the agreement to arbitrate unenforceable. Under this Court's decisions in *Southland* and *Perry*, therefore, the Montana statute is preempted by the FAA.

Indeed, in a recent pronouncement on the FAA, this Court reaffirmed that, under its holdings in *Southland* and *Perry*, the FAA preempts state laws that seek to invalidate arbitration agreements. See *Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson*, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995); accord *Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.*, 115 S. Ct. 1212, 1215-16 (1995). In *Terminix*, this Court decisively rejected a request to overrule *Southland* and permit state courts to apply their own anti-arbitration laws regardless of whether interstate commerce was involved, holding that *Southland* was well-established law and that, consequently, Alabama could not apply its statute barring pre-dispute arbitration agreements to invalidate an arbitration provision. *Terminix*, 115 S. Ct. at 838-39. After observing that the "basic purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to overcome courts' refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate" and to place those agreements "upon the same footing as other contracts," *id.* at 838 (quoting *Volt*, 489 U.S. at 474), Justice Breyer, writing for this Court, concluded that while "States may regulate contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law principles and they may invalidate an arbitration clause 'upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract'[,] . . . [w]hat States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its arbitration clause," *Terminix*, 115 S. Ct. at 843 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2) (emphasis in original).

Montana has done precisely what this Court and numerous other federal and state courts over the past decade have held that it cannot do: It has decided that contracts are fair enough to enforce all their basic terms, even absent a special notice designed to bring the existence of those terms to the parties' attention, but that arbitration agreements are not fair enough to enforce without such a notice. Since this Court in *Terminix* made clear that state laws that place arbitration agreements "on an unequal footing" by definition undermine the goals and policies of the FAA, *Terminix*, 115 S. Ct. at 843, the Montana Supreme Court's refusal on remand to apply the principles reaffirmed in *Terminix* requires reversal.

The Montana Supreme Court's holding also disregards the contrary decisions from the three federal courts of appeals that have addressed the issue, all of which have invalidated arbitration notice provisions similar to the Montana statute. See, e.g., *David L. Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft, Ltd. (London)*, 923 F.2d 245, 249-50 (2d Cir.), *cert. dismissed*, 501 U.S. 1267 (1991) (invalidating a Vermont statute that required agreements to arbitrate to be "prominently displayed" in contracts and signed by the parties); *Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly*, 883 F.2d 1114, 1120 (1st Cir. 1989), *cert. denied*, 495 U.S. 956 (1990) (invalidating a state regulation requiring full written disclosure of "the legal effect of the pre-dispute arbitration contract or clause"); *Webb v. R. Rowland & Co.*, 800 F.2d 803, 806-07 (8th Cir. 1986) (invalidating a requirement that contracts highlight the existence of arbitration clauses in 10-point capital letters); *Collins Radio Co. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp.*, 467 F.2d 995, 997-99 (8th Cir. 1972) (invalidating a requirement that arbitration agreements bear an attorney's acknowledgement that all parties have been advised of the agreement's effects). Instead, the Montana Supreme

Court has joined a growing number of state courts that have reinvigorated the former hostility to arbitration by concluding that arbitration notice provisions do not run afoul of the FAA. *See, e.g., American Physicians Service Group, Inc. v. Port Lavaca Clinic Assoc.*, 843 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (en banc), *writ of error denied* (Tex. Apr. 21, 1993); *Albright v. Edward D. Jones & Co.*, 571 N.E.2d 1329, 1332-33 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), *cert. denied*, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992). In addition, a number of states have similar laws that single out arbitration agreements for unfavorable treatment by regulating the placement and acknowledgment of arbitration agreements in certain types of contracts.² Courts in those states could well be encouraged by the Montana Supreme Court's decision below to uphold similar anti-arbitration statutes against preemption attacks. Thus, there is a compelling need for this Court to reverse the decision of the Montana Supreme Court in order to signal to state courts and legislatures that, for purposes of preemption under the FAA, statutory notice provisions for arbitration are no less hostile to arbitration than were the statutes at issue in *Southland* and *Perry*.

B. The Montana Supreme Court's Decision Distorts This Court's Reasoning In *Volt*

In sustaining the Montana statute against a preemption attack, the Montana Supreme Court persists in its distortion of this Court's reasoning in *Volt* in several respects. First, the decision below completely disregards the parties' arbitration agreement. As this Court observed in *Volt*, the primary purpose of the FAA is to enforce

² See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 23 nn. 20 & 21 (citing statutes).

"privately negotiated arbitration agreements"; thus, parties to an arbitration agreement should be "at liberty to choose the terms under which they will arbitrate." 489 U.S. at 472. Here, the parties chose the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules and Connecticut law, not Montana law, to govern their arbitration agreement. Since neither Connecticut law nor the AAA's rules nor the FAA conditions the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate on the existence of a notice provision, *Volt* cannot support the result reached by the Montana Supreme Court. On the contrary, the very notion of enforcing a notice provision *not* chosen by the parties to invalidate an arbitration provision *chosen* by the parties is completely antithetical to the teaching of *Volt* and strikes at the heart of the FAA's purpose—to ensure that private agreements to arbitrate are rigorously enforced according to their terms.

Second, the Montana Supreme Court's unduly narrow interpretation of the scope of federal preemption of state arbitration laws is impossible to square with *Volt*. Purportedly relying on *Volt*, the Montana Supreme Court in its initial opinion declared that Montana's notice requirement does not "undermine the goals and policies of the FAA" because Congress never intended to preempt the entire field of arbitration and because the FAA does not require parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so. App. B at 26a. The Montana Supreme Court reaffirmed that holding in its most recent opinion, finding that *Terminix* had not modified the preemption language in *Volt* on which the Montana Supreme Court had relied in its earlier opinion. However, this Court's statement in *Volt* that the FAA does not entirely preempt state arbitration law was made in reference to a California *procedural* statute that merely had the effect of delaying an arbitration until after litigation of related claims had

occurred—and under circumstances where the parties had chosen that law to govern their arbitration. Thus, the California law affected only the timing of arbitration, and did not purport to prohibit arbitration altogether. Here, however, the Montana Supreme Court has interpreted *Volt* to permit a state to ban arbitration in its entirety, notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration agreement enforceable under the laws of the parties' own choosing. Even if the parties had chosen Montana law to govern their franchise agreement, the Montana Supreme Court's holding would still be indefensible, because choice-of-law clauses, like arbitration agreements generally, must be construed in light of the federal presumption that resolves all doubts in favor of arbitrability. See *Mastrobuono*, 115 S. Ct. at 1218 & n. 8.

Nor does the justification offered by the Montana Supreme Court for its holding—that the FAA mandates the enforcement only of those arbitration agreements that are “knowingly” entered into—survive scrutiny. Since the “knowing” requirement applies only to arbitration agreements and not to contracts generally in Montana, it is preempted under *Southland* and *Perry*. Although Montana could ban all standard form contracts in an effort to ensure that parties with inferior bargaining power “know” what they are agreeing to, it cannot impose this requirement only on arbitration agreements. Behind Montana's preoccupation with ensuring that arbitration agreements are “knowingly” entered into lies considerable legislative and judicial hostility toward arbitration. Because the Montana Supreme Court's purported solicitude for arbitration may encourage other state courts or legislatures to employ similar artifices to turn the FAA on its head, it is critical that this Court reverse decision below.

II.

THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT'S DECISION REPRESENTS UNSOUND PUBLIC POLICY

Arbitration notice provisions like Montana's not only run afoul of the Supremacy Clause and Section 2 of the FAA but also represent unsound public policy based on discredited judicial and legislative hostility to arbitration. Opponents of arbitration have long maintained that arbitration represents an inferior, and inadequate, form of justice compared with traditional litigation because (they say) it deprives parties of, among other things, substantive rights under state statutory and common law, the right to a jury trial, wide-ranging discovery procedures, a broad right of appeal, competent adjudicators and, in many cases, an in-state forum. Detractors of arbitration also question the consensual nature of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, pointing out that those agreements are often contained in non-negotiated form contracts between parties of unequal bargaining power. These anti-arbitration sentiments, barely concealed in the initial majority opinion of the Montana Supreme Court, came to the surface in the special concurring opinion of Justice Trieweler filed with the initial majority opinion. App. B at 28a-32a. Although the Montana Supreme Court has since attempted to distance itself from those sentiments as the basis for its holding, especially in light of the language in *Terminix* “extolling the virtues of arbitration,” App. A at 7a (citing *Terminix*, 115 S. Ct. at 843), its continuing animosity to arbitration is apparent when it attributes this Court's recognition of the benefits of arbitration to partisan “input” from the AAA. App. A at 7a. There is little question that the Montana Supreme Court's holding continues to be motivated by a distrust of arbitration and the benefits it affords.

This Court, however, has repeatedly dismissed as unfounded the various objections to arbitration noted above³ and, in doing so, has acknowledged the many benefits of arbitration. These include speed, *see, e.g., Terminix*, 115 S. Ct. at 843; economy, *see, e.g., id.*; informality and adaptability of procedures; *see, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.*, 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985); availability of expert adjudicators, *see, e.g., Mitsubishi*, 473 U.S. at 633; and ability to preserve the disputants' relationship after the matter is concluded, *see Terminix*, 115 S. Ct. at 843. Moreover, as this Court has observed, arbitration offers advantages to large and small businesses as well as to individuals, notwithstanding that it is often invoked under a form contract between parties having unequal bargaining power. *See Terminix*, 115 S. Ct. at 843; *Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.*, 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1655 (1991).

Permitting the decision below to stand, with its inherent bias against arbitration, will encourage other state courts and legislatures to seek various ways to impair the enforceability of arbitration agreements, with serious repercussions for all business relationships that rely on arbitration to effectively and economically resolve disputes, but particu-

³ The various objections to arbitration which this Court has dismissed include: 1) its inability to further important social policies, *see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.*, 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1653 (1991); 2) inherent bias of arbitrators, *see id.* at 1654; *Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.*, 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985); 3) lack of discovery procedures, *see Gilmer*, 111 S. Ct. at 1654-55; 4) lack of meaningful judicial review, *see Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon*, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987); incompetence of arbitrators, *see McMahon*, 482 U.S. at 232; 5) limitations on substantive rights or relief, *see Gilmer*, 111 S. Ct. at 1655; and 7) its use by parties of unequal bargaining power, *Gilmer*, 111 S. Ct. at 1655.

larly for the franchise industry. Arbitration enjoys widespread use in franchise relationships because it offers many advantages over traditional litigation to franchisors and franchisees. Arbitration is typically much less expensive than litigation because of the absence of, or limitations on, pleading requirements, motion practice, discovery and pretrial procedures. Since many disputes between franchisors and franchisees, such as claims for nonpayment of royalty fees, involve relatively small amounts of money, arbitration enables the parties to resolve these disputes economically without incurring legal expenses that might otherwise approximate the entire value of the claim. Moreover, the great majority of franchisors are relatively small companies and, like many franchisees, cannot afford the high cost associated with pursuing or defending claims in a judicial forum. For the same reasons, arbitration is also the prevailing method used to resolve disputes in retail securities brokerage relationships. Arbitration affords investors a cost-effective method to assert claims and resolve disputes with securities brokers.

The elimination or reduction in scope of motion practice, discovery and pretrial procedures in arbitration also makes it generally much quicker than litigation. The relative speed with which arbitrations proceed from the initial filing of the arbitration demand to the issuance of an award and, if necessary, confirmation of the award by a court, not only will in most cases cost the parties less in attorneys' fees but also will enable them to resume their relationship more quickly, without the continuing disruptive influence of a pending lawsuit. This advantage of arbitration is particularly significant to franchisors and franchisees since the disputes between these parties that give rise to arbitration often will not signal the end of the franchise relationship.

For largely similar reasons, the informality and often less adversarial nature of arbitration are important because they enhance the prospect that a franchisor and its franchisee will be able to honor their contractual obligations while the arbitration is pending and put aside their differences once the arbitration has concluded, keeping their relationship intact. Franchise relationships are unique in today's business world because they typically run for a period of ten to twenty years. Since disputes are more likely to arise in a relationship of that length, arbitration offers a method for resolving those disputes while preserving the long-term nature of the relationship. Moreover, because arbitration is more flexible with regard to scheduling times and places of hearings, it tends to be less disruptive of the day-to-day operations of franchisors and franchisees alike, an important consideration in light of the fact that many franchisors and franchisees are small businesses with limited personnel. Finally, arbitration also offers the parties to a franchise relationship the option of having an individual experienced in franchising adjudicate their dispute. Because franchising is a unique form of business organization and is subject to a wide array of registration, disclosure and relationship laws, franchising expertise is often a sought-after qualification of arbitrators chosen to decide franchise disputes.

Moreover, there is nothing inherent in the arbitration process itself that favors franchisors over franchisees. Contrary to the anti-arbitration sentiments expressed in the initial special concurring opinion of Justice Trieweller, App. B at 28a-32a, franchisees are often sophisticated, multi-unit operators who, on their own behalf or through counsel, negotiate the terms of their franchise agreements, including whether and under what circumstances arbitration of disputes will occur. Although arbitration agree-

ments often provide for arbitration in the franchisor's home state, there are sound business reasons for a franchisor to consolidate disputes with its franchisees in a forum where it can resolve them as cost-effectively as possible. It is certainly no more burdensome for an individual franchisee to arbitrate once in the franchisor's home state than it is for a national franchisor to arbitrate many times in the home states of its franchisees. Indeed, in light of this Court's decision in *Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute*, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991), which upheld the enforceability of a non-negotiated choice-of-forum clause printed on the reverse side of a cruise line passenger ticket, forum selection clauses in the franchise relationship—a business relationship—are beyond reproach.

Enforcement of arbitration agreements in the franchise relationship will also produce systemic benefits, economizing on the scarce judicial resources available for resolving other disputes where parties may not be in a position to structure a dispute resolution procedure in advance. Those scarce judicial resources are consumed not only when a dispute subject to arbitration is instead resolved in a judicial forum but also when parties, encouraged by anti-arbitration decisions like those of the Montana Supreme Court in this case, initiate satellite litigation such as this to challenge the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate. Even if the franchisor ultimately succeeds on appeal in enforcing the agreement to arbitrate, significant judicial resources will often have been spent on both the trial and appellate level in reaching that result.

However, these benefits of arbitration will be realized by franchisors (and franchisees), as well as the judicial system as a whole, only if state courts and state legislatures are reminded that attempts to undermine the en-

forceability of agreements to arbitrate, like Montana's, will not go unnoticed by this Court. Otherwise, state legislatures will be unleashed to formulate all manner of requirements for, and obstacles to, arbitration agreements, and the sound public policy that underlies the FAA will be subverted. Although it may seem theoretically possible for a national franchisor to track such rules and adjust the arbitration provisions of its contracts to meet their requirements, in practice this would prove extremely burdensome and probably impossible.

Even if national franchisors undertook the burdensome task of tailoring their contract documents to meet the varying and often conflicting arbitration laws of 50 different states, they would not be assured of having their arbitration agreements enforced, as this case itself demonstrates. A court—like the Montana Supreme Court in this case—may simply choose to disregard the parties' choice-of-law clause out of hostility toward arbitration and apply a state notice requirement or other state anti-arbitration law that the parties never expected, much less intended, would be applied to their relationship. Since a nationwide franchisor cannot anticipate in what state it might be sued or what state's arbitration statute might apply, it has no effective means of assuring that it can partake of the benefits of arbitration that Congress sought to promote by enacting the FAA.

What has been written above concerning franchisors is equally true for securities firms. Most of SIA's members do business in multiple states, some in all states. Firms use a universal agreement for all customers and expect them to be enforced equally in all jurisdictions. Montana, by singling out arbitration clauses for special notices not required for any other type of contract or clause, has created

costly obstacles to the ability to use universal agreements in the securities industry while also violating the purpose and intent of Section 2 of the FAA.

Furthermore, once a franchise agreement or securities customer agreement containing an arbitration clause is signed, it cannot be amended to comply with a subsequently enacted precondition to the validity and enforceability of the arbitration clause. It is far from clear under current law that such a legislative enactment would not be applied to a preexisting contract on the basis that it changed substantive rights, since a court could construe a dispute resolution provision as purely procedural in nature. Thus, the validity of tens of thousands of arbitration agreements may be made uncertain retroactively by the enactment of such legislation, resulting in extensive litigation to determine whether particular state-imposed requirements for arbitration agreements are preempted by the FAA. It is far sounder public policy to reiterate the long-standing and well understood rule that the FAA preempts any state requirement that segregates arbitration agreements from other contracts and imposes preconditions to their validity and enforceability that are not applicable to contracts generally. This Court should definitively and finally close the door to such state efforts to undermine arbitration agreements governed by the FAA.

CONCLUSION

IFA and SIA respectfully request that this Court reverse the decision of the Montana Supreme Court and remand the case to that court with instructions to enforce the arbitration clause at issue.

Respectfully submitted,

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